Realpolitik and massacres: from Gujarat to Sri Lanka if you can’t try them, do business

Narendra Modi, Chief Minister of Gujarat, India

Recently¹ the UK High Commissioner planned a visit to Gujarat. The aim is to strengthen economic ties for British companies. But the mission will be very limited in scope without meeting the Chief Minister of the State, Narendra Modi. The controversial leader is one of the most accredited candidate of the opposition to win the next national elections. The controversy has its origin in the 2002 communal riots, which took place in Gujarat. Thousands were killed, prevalently Muslims. Mr Modi is accused of slow reaction and of superficial investigation of the culprits. In fact his own party, the nationalistic BJP, is believed to be highly responsible and directly involved in the incidents. In the following years an implicit agreement amongst European diplomats effectively cut off any major relation with Mr Modi. Now, with Gujarat elections coming in less than a month, the move of the British High Commissioner is a clear message: the stop of the diplomatic embargo against Narendra Modi.

Gujarat communal riots, 2002.

The comment is: what can you do? Can you really boycott the democratic will of a state? Can you seriously interfere with the internal political life of a foreign country? Of course not. A massacre happened, thousands were killed. Can we exercise more pressure to obtain justice for them? No. So let’s make a move and lobby for your companies. Better now on the minor stage of regional election than later on under national (and international) spotlight.

The other, implicit message is: we firmly stand against perpetrators of crimes and atrocities. But only up to a certain point. When the cost of principles is higher than the economic return, principles can go back to be a fight of intellectuals.

Foreign Ministers from UK, Mr. Milliband, and from France, Mr Kouchner, meet Sri Lanka’s president Mr Rajapaksa.

The British government tried the “impossible” in 2009, sending even Mr Milliband. He and Mr Kouchner fought for a couple of days with words, then they gave up. Verbally, the international community condemned the massacres of 40 000 (according to UN) (though it is likely to be more than double that, with the most dramatic estimates putting the figure at 140 000), but no action seriously concerns the Rajapaksa administration. Why?

First, you can say geopolitical reasons. China, India, the String of Pearls. So Europe was really toothless in that occasion. And after 3 years you have to decide: can you do justice to the victims. The answer of the British government has been a sound no. It’s too early to trial the government, it’s too late to save the victims. So let’s move on. There are alliances and businesses to attend.

Sri Lanka’s president Rajapaksa and the Queen, Elizabeth II.

This year Rajapaksa was invited for the Queen’s Jubilee and later on for the inauguration of the Olympics. Sri Lanka will also host the Commonwealth summit in 2013.

What is wrong is that the events of 2009 don’t have culprits. But everybody in the international community has enough information that clearly points at the president and at his administration. Maybe it’s too early for an international trial and it is definitely too late to save the victims. Nonetheless you are still in time to stand for justice and truth. Brutality and crime against humanity are always on the wrong side. Is there really a need to say it? It appears so, because the urge to do business, to come first for deals, can obscure even the most basic principles.

It is not always good diplomacy to confront a country; the USA made a mission to isolate Iran. Maybe the UK doesn’t have the power and the will to be so vocal against Sri Lanka.

But if you start now to have normalized relationships, it is an implicit admission of acceptance for what happened.

The message is: stand for principles till you can, then shake hands and sign contracts.

1http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/10/narendra-modi

The pillars of Rajapaksa’s wisdom:Indian support, crash the LTTE and no-stop business

India is not on the side of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, but Tamils are on the side of India. So it seems that in the IV Eelam War, the Tamils were an impediment on the path of New Delhi to achieve its goals: it didn’t want them on its side.

Hence New Delhi backed Rajapaksa up and not the Tamils. The policy of Rajapaksa has been defined by three main poles: to annihilate the LTTE, to increase wealth and to concentrate power and wealth in his own hands.

The military campaign seems instrumental to guarantee a firm support, blinding the Sri Lankan citizens in favor of the increasingly despotic attitudes of the President.

The hunt for deals ranged from Iran (biggest supplier of oil and biggest donor in 2008 with more than $1 billion) to Pakistan (bilateral trade stands at $400 million but is expected to reach $2 billions in a year time), not to mention the Chinese aid: from few millions in 2005, Beijing pledged more than 3.7 billion in loans for infrastructures and related project, but the real figures could be much higher, including the military assistance and undisclosed deals. And Rajapaksa put under tight control this expansion: 70% of the national budget is under direct family control ( source: The Economist ).

The conclusion we can draw from India’s conduct in the IV Eelam War is that New Delhi blesses the business enterprise of Mr. Rajapaksa.